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AMENDED CLD-140 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




IN RE:  OSSIE R. TRADER,
                           Petitioner
__________________________
Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Related to ED/PA Criminal No. 94-cr-00534-002)
__________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
March 19, 2009
Before:    RENDELL, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON,  Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 13, 2009)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Ossie R. Trader, a federal prisoner, petitions this Court pro se, seeking a writ of
mandamus directed at the Clerk and Deputy Clerks of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the
petition.
In 1994, Trader and two associates were arrested on charges of armed bank
robbery, conspiracy, and related crimes.  Trader entered a plea of not guilty and, through
     In its entirety, the docket entry reads: “(Court only) ** Terminated motion(s) as to1
OSSIE R. TRADER, CHARMAINE TRADER: MOTION FOR SEVERANCE,
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS, MOTION
TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, MOTION FOR HEARING AND DEFENDANT’S
PRETRIAL DETENTION.  (Guilty Plea) (rs) (Entered: 01/14/1998).”  The Government
filed the “Motion for Hearing and Defendant’s Pretrial Detention.”  See Docket No. 12. 
Because Trader did not bring that motion, we will assume his dispute does not extend to
the disposition of that motion.
2
counsel, began preparing for trial.  Among other things, Trader filed several motions: a
motion to compel pre-trial discovery, a motion claiming the violation of his right to a
speedy trial, and a motion for severance.  See Docket Nos. 34, 40, 42.  In June 1995, after
a change of plea hearing, Trader changed his plea to guilty.  See Docket Nos. 47, 48.  The
District Court accepted the guilty plea, scheduled a sentencing hearing, and sentenced
Trader to a term of 248 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release.  In
January 1998, two and a half years after Trader entered his guilty plea, the District Court
Clerk administratively terminated Trader’s motions.   1
In his mandamus petition, Trader argues that the Clerk of the District Court lacked
the power to terminate the motions, absent an express “order, Judgment, or decree” by the
District Court.  Trader seeks an order directing the Clerk to delete the docket entry, as
well as an order prohibiting the Clerk from violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 951, the statute setting forth the oath of the office of clerks
and deputies.
Mandamus is a drastic remedy granted only in extraordinary cases.  See In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  To prevail, a petitioner must
3establish that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ, and “no other
adequate means” to obtain relief.  Id. at 378-79.  Trader cannot establish a “clear and
indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.  
The management of its docket is committed to the sound discretion of the District
Court.  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir.1982).  We will not
interfere with that discretion except upon the clearest showing that the District Court’s
action substantially prejudiced the litigant.  See id.  Here, Trader cannot show that he was
prejudiced when the Clerk, acting for the District Court, made a docket entry
administratively terminating Trader’s motions.  
“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of
the guilty plea.”  Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  Trader waived his
speedy trial claim by entering his guilty plea.  See Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162,
166 and n. 5 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).  He also waived his constitutional right to a jury
trial, see United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 607 (3d Cir. 1973); without a trial, Trader’s
motions for pre-trial discovery and for severance became moot.  Thus, because he waived
the right to pursue the relief he sought by his motions, Trader suffered no prejudice when
the Clerk of the District Court made a docket entry administratively terminating them. 
Trader has made at least three previous attempts to reinstate his speedy trial claim
by seeking mandamus in this Court.  See 285 Fed. App’x 973 (3d Cir. 2008); 226 Fed.
    Trader has filed documents in this Court that he considers letters submitted under Rule2
28(j), Fed. R. App. P., which provides for the citation of supplemental authority after a
party’s brief has been filed.  We have considered his documents as supplements to his
mandamus petition.  In the second of these documents, Trader asserts that Judge
Baylson’s order filed March 19, 2009, in Civ. No. 09-mc-00019, constitutes an answer to
his mandamus petition that was unauthorized because it was not solicited by this Court. 
We disagree.  It appears that a service copy of the mandamus petition filed in this Court
also was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on that
court’s miscellaneous docket.  Judge Baylson’s order filed in that matter does not
constitute an answer to the mandamus petition that is before us today. 
4
App’x 100 (3d Cir 2007); 161 Fed. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2006).  As we have repeatedly
informed Trader, the speedy trial motion was terminated due to his guilty plea.  If he
wishes to challenge his guilty plea, he may not do so in a petition for a writ of mandamus. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.2
